International
Political
Sociology

International Political Sociology (2009) **3**, 257–274

Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex

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In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault famously declares that ''our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance.'' Our theoretical aim in this paper is to problematize Foucault's strict demarcation between spectacle and surveillance through an analysis of urban mega-events. In the process, we detail emerging features of contemporary mega-events that shape and are shaped by shifts in the field of security and surveillance more broadly. Three dynamics in particular warrant consideration: the move toward a precautionary logic among security planners, a ''semiotic shift'' wherein security iconography is integrally bound up with the production of contemporary urban spectacles, and various forms of security and surveillance legacies that circulate beyond the spatial and temporal frame of the event itself. While mega-events support Foucault's assertion of the dispersal of discipline across the social field, they also suggest that this dispersal occurs in concert with, not in spite of, the power of the spectacle in contemporary society.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (hereafter 9/11) it can be difficult to keep abreast of the rapid security developments in the global North.[1] Rather than produce a synoptic overview of these diverse developments, this paper focuses on issues that arise out of contemporary efforts to secure mega-events.

Mega-events are high-profile, deeply symbolic affairs that typically circulate from host city to host city. The classic examples are the Olympic Games, World Exhibitions, and FIFA World Cup (Roche 2000). Highly prized by national and civic planners, they are simultaneously political, economic and cultural happenings that can reap a windfall of publicity and initiate infrastructural projects long on the municipal ''wish list.'' Mega-events are also critical junctures where globally mediated urban identities are refashioned, future directions forged, and past lineages overwritten in a context of intense global inter-urban competition (Harvey 1989; Peck and Tickell 2002). Planners seeking a catalyst to redefine their cities recognize mega-events as a rare opportunity to do so. The intense media coverage of these events offers an opportunity to promote a distinctive image of the city to a global audience that can, it is hoped, consolidate its position within the global hierarchy of cities (Degen 2004; Hiller 2006). So, for example, the City of Vancouver's strategic economic plan anticipates thousands of hours of media coverage during the 2010 Winter Games to

> provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to position Vancouver as a global center for business—a city built on innovation and creativity, a city that values and

[1]The authors wish to thank Minas Samatas, Eric Topfer, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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> practices principles of sustainability—and translate this position into new business investment, and long-term economic legacies (City of Vancouver 2007:5).

While the Olympic Games have always occurred within a wider geopolitical context (Atkinson and Young 2005), it was arguably the 1972 Munich Olympics when Palestinian militants killed eleven Israeli athletes that terrorism and the Olympics were first coupled in popular consciousness (Cottrell 2003). Such connections have only intensified in the aftermath of 9/11 in relation to all large, media-saturated events where large crowds gather (see Wong 2001 for example). Peter Ryan, leading security consultant for the International Olympic Committee (hereafter IOC), recently expressed the view that it is ''only a matter of time before terrorists target a major North American sports venue'' (quoted in the *Houston Chronicle* 2007).

These events are one component in a wider post-Cold War shift in the geographical imaginings of security. During the Cold War, security was typically conceptualized through the prism of national security. As a consequence, national borders were the primary ''fronts'' to be secured, prompting spatial configurations of security programs that approximated these borders such as the North American DEW line (Bauman 2002; Hirst 2005). The end of the Cold War contributed to a re-calibration of security due to perceived changes in the nature of national and international threats. While ballistic missiles rocketing over the North Pole toward North America remain a possibility, such scenarios have been downgraded in the consciousness of security officials. In their stead are nerve gas attacks in Japanese subways, backpacks exploding in the London Underground, and most prominently, hijacked aircrafts serving as human-propelled rockets. The targets of these attacks were previously thought to be sheltered behind strong sovereign borders. The cumulative weight of such events has encouraged security officials to recognize that coordinated sub-national groups have the will and the means to produced threats on a scale which was previously the exclusive purview of the nation state. Conceptions of security have consequently become increasingly sub-national, regional, and urban in scale (Graham 2004). While national borders remain important both as physical barriers and as part of the symbolism of the nation-state (Tirnman 2004), the primary fronts for security programs underwritten by recent developments are increasingly urban-centered. Mega-events figure prominently in the dynamics of this global re-calibration of security.

Our aims in this paper are threefold. At the most general theoretical level we want to challenge the strict demarcation that Michel Foucault proposed between spectacle and surveillance. We also use mega-events as an entrée to understanding dynamics related to contemporary security more generally. Finally, we consider an expanded security logic that informs planning for such events, how security itself has become spectacular, and some of the ways that mega-events contribute to a legacy of security dynamics that can outlast any particular event.[2]

[2]This paper draws from an ongoing research project commenced in 2005 on security dynamics pertaining to mega-events with a particular emphasis on the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games. To date this has entailed two research trips to Vancouver, British Columbia, one to Ottawa, Ontario, and one to London (UK) to conduct interviews with key informants. Twenty-three interviews have been conducted in total. The interviews were semi-structured and involved questions pertaining to dynamics and changes in mega-event security, the long-term security legacies of these events, and the wider networks of knowledge pertaining to securing such events. The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by members of the research team. We have also amassed a small archive of wide-ranging government and non-governmental documents dealing with mega-event security. This includes postevent analysis and recommendation reports from government and non-governmental observers, various reports and testimonials from individuals involved in specific events, law enforcement manuals and trade journals, reports from non-governmental authorities in the security industry, security industry trade publications and association reports, and official publications from the International Olympics Committee and Olympic host organizations. The authors have also obtained original documents regarding Canada's preparations for the 2010 Games through Freedom of Information requests to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Public Safety, and other relevant government agencies. The project also draws on publicly available news sources and on the existing academic literature on the Olympics and other major events.

Spectacle and Discipline

Foucault's proclamation that ''our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance'' (Foucault 1977:217) is one of the most famous statements in his wide body of work. While unreferenced, it was an unmistakable swipe at Guy Debord's book *Society of the Spectacle* (Debord 1977). In that volume, Debord draws attention to how the mass mediatization of society ushered in a world dominated by images removed from lived reality, images that are ultimately reunited in an autonomous realm set apart from daily experience. Debord suggests that society as a whole has been transformed into a single gigantic spectacle, a totalizing media event fashioned for passive consumption. He condemns this development because it tends to isolate individuals, inhibit dialogue and ultimately thwart the development of a class consciousness.

Foucault's dismissal of spectacle arises in the context of his own well-known articulation of a model of disciplinary power (Foucault 1977). For Foucault, the spectacle is entirely bound up with the unique attributes of sovereign power. Such power is embodied in the sovereign and condensed in formal legal prohibitions and occasionally manifest in highly public attacks on the bodies of citizens. It is this ''spectacle of the scaffold'' that most dramatically represents the sovereign's powers over life and death to a public audience. Foucault's argument, however, is that such public spectacles receded in the eighteenth-century with the ascendancy of a new and more effective disciplinary model of power. Discipline was itself contingent on the rise of social scientific knowledges focused on the human species which relied upon a host of techniques for ordering bodies in space, classification, documentation and surveillance. Such practices dispersed through the social body to become the foundation of a society-wide diagram of disciplinary power.

It is in articulating the relative decline of sovereign power that Foucault suggests a binary demarcation between a society of spectacle and a society of surveillance. However, consideration of contemporary mega-events suggests that this is too crude of a formulation. Spectacle persists, and as we suggest below, it now operates in concert with discipline and surveillance.

Bennett (1995) has argued that Foucault could only maintain his thesis about the decline of spectacle by virtue of concentrating exclusively on punishment and ignoring a host of other prominent historical developments. Perhaps the most iconic of these initiatives was the Crystal Palace, which serves as an architectural exemplar, contra the panopticon, of contemporary spectacle, in that it sought to display magnificent commodities to a mass audience. In the nineteenth century the city itself underwent a process of visualization, as public tours of such diverse phenomena as the stock exchange and sewer system served to put the city on display. The state was centrally involved in fashioning this ''exhibitionary complex'' (Bennett 1995) by virtue of establishing grand exhibitions, museums and art galleries, many of which permanently demonstrated sovereign power to a mass audience while also offering public instruction in cultural meanings pertaining to empire, race, and the state.

Rather than spectacle being in decline, it has mutated and often intensified, something that can be attributed to the confluence of state and corporate interests and the rise of a mass media. To interrogate the relationship between spectacle and security, however, we must first abandon Debord's notion of a single spectacle, a formulation that suggests a seamless and solitary set of global relations. Instead, spectacle involves ongoing processes whereby social life is processed and packaged for mass visual consumption in a society increasingly oriented to appearances in the service of capitalism. This emphasis on multiple processes rather than on a single form allows us to recognize degrees in the spectacularity of different phenomena. It also invites attention to how spectacle

is differentially manifest at various times and on different spatial scales. Many phenomena have spectacular dimensions, but at any given moment these vary in terms of the intensity of their media hype and profile. Today, mega-events represent some of the most prominent public spectacles. It is this self-same spectacularity that escalates them in the mind of security planners as a premier target for terrorist attacks, prompting new processes of securitization where surveillance figures prominently—a process that forges links between discipline and spectacle while also offering a pedagogy in sovereign power.

Thinking Outside the Box

In describing the security preparations for the 2000 Sydney Olympics, travel writer Bill Bryson noted that planners had analyzed every contingency short of an asteroid strike or a nuclear attack (Bryson 2000:330). In the aftermath of 9/11, Olympic security planners would not be so sanguine as to ignore the possibility of a nuclear attack.

When security officials scrutinize the recent past in order to plan for terrorist attacks, a major lesson they take away from 9/11 is that domestic security threats exist on a scale that was previously imagined only in warfare. More importantly, they acknowledge that their potential manifestation is wildly unpredictable. One result has been the continuous reiteration in official circles that security planners must ''think outside the box.'' It is a sentiment meant to signify the need to contemplate a host of exceptionally unlikely but potentially catastrophic events. The *Threat Analysis* report of the Canadian Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness,[3] for example, warns that owners and operators of Canada's critical infrastructure (CI) need to prepare for another event equal or greater to 9/11:

> Those events [9/11] have altered the way in which emergency management professionals, policy makers, and the owners and operators of CI conduct their affairs because the possibility, regardless of how remote, that an event on an equally grand scale might occur again precipitates the need for robust and flexible mitigation (OCIEP 2003:48).

The key phrase here is that officials must prepare for events ''regardless of how remote,'' as it is precisely this sentiment which reveals a burgeoning logic in the security world. It is a sentiment embraced by prominent Olympic security expert Peter Ryan, who noted that security planners for the Sydney Olympics had considered scenarios ''that would sound bizarre and outlandish to non-security experts'' and that the 9/11 attacks escalated this process as they ''focused our minds very closely on the fact that, if terrorists could mount an attack like that, we would have to plan for every contingency,'' something he characterized as ''thinking the unthinkable'' (quoted in Host City 2008). As de Goede (2008:166) has recently pointed out, the notion of ''thinking the unthinkable'' ''clearly exceeds established techniques of statistical calculation and risk management.'' It reflects instead the ostensible incalculability of contemporary terrorism in terms of both anticipating future events as well as mitigating their effects, and the widespread governmental impulse after 9/11 to plan for every contingency ''regardless of how remote'' (Lakoff 2007).

The ascendancy of the sentiment of incalculable risk has shifted security thinking towards a form of precautionary governance, a logic that is associated predominantly with environmental protection but is increasingly expressed in security domains ranging from personal crime prevention (Haggerty 2003), the

[3]Since 2003 incorporated into the Department of Public Safety.

Table 1 Security Expenditures for Olympic Summer Games, 1984–2004

Games	*Expenditures (million USD)*	*Cost per athlete (USD)*
Los Angeles (1984)	79.4 million	11,627
Seoul (1988)	111.7 million	13,312
Barcelona (1992)	66.2 million	7,072
Atlanta (1996)	108.2 million	10,486
Sydney (2000)	179.6 million	16,062
Athens (2004)	1.5 billion	142,897

Source: *Wall Street Journal*, August 22, 2004, cited in Coaffee and Murakami-Wood (2006:513).

governance of dangerous offenders (Hebenton and Seddon 2009), and the anti-terrorism initiatives (Stern and Weiner 2006; Aradau and van Munster 2007; de Goede 2008). There has been a comparative repositioning of efforts to anticipate the probability of future attacks based on a rational scrutiny of past experience and a greater embrace of a non-actuarial planning orientation focused on what could *potentially* happen independent of probability assessments. Security planners are being encouraged to conceive the future through a consideration of worst-case scenarios (Clarke 2006). Here Beck's (2002) notion of de-bounded risks assumes a new meaning; not only are risks spatially, temporally, and socially de-bounded, they are also de-bounded from quantitative, predictive actuarialism and invigorated with cultural constructions and speculative popular imaginations about what could potentially transpire. As a former security executive with the National Football League and National Basketball Association put it, ''the once ridiculous 'what-ifs' now have to be taken seriously'' (quoted in Copetas 2001).

Mega-events are particularly fertile grounds for the articulation of precautionary thinking and no less an authority than *Jane's Intelligence Review* (Hinds and Vlachou 2007) cautions about the embrace of ''high consequence aversion'' where nightmare scenarios drive costly and inappropriate security measures. Indeed, the massive increase in funds that Olympic security efforts now command is one crude indication of this development (see Table 1).

The potential for historically novel, unforeseeable, and catastrophic forms of terrorism presents difficulties for counter-terrorism preparedness. A division director within the RCMP, Canada's federal policing agency responsible for security for the 2010 Winter Games, explained to us the effects of 9/11 on major event security planning in Canada, noting that ''I think [9/11] sensitized us to the fact that terrorists will be very innovative and more sophisticated than perhaps we anticipate. 9/11 forced us to look at the broader potential risks that we face, and it brought about a whole means of reviewing our practices to mitigate those threats to Canada in general.'' The first events to be revisited in the wider global networks of mega-event planning were the New Orleans Super Bowl and the Salt Lake Winter Games, both occurring in early 2002 and within months of 9/11. Each event was declared a National Special Security Event (NSSE), the first sporting events to receive such a designation in the United States, and which resulted in significantly more federal involvement (through the US Secret Service [USSS], Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], and Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), and funds being devoted to security (Reese 2008).[4]

Athens organizers had the 2 years following 9/11 to revisit their initial Olympic security preparations. Like in Salt Lake, 9/11 was ''the turning point'' for Athens

[4]The 2002 Salt Lake Winter Games were declared an NSSE before 9/11 as a means to address the perceived failings of security at the 1996 Atlanta Games. One of the main problems afflicting the Atlanta Games was the lack of inter-agency cooperation and communication between federal, state, and local law enforcement and other emergency planners (Buntin 2000). Without the intervening events of 9/11, the NSSE designation was an important tool in working out the problems associated with Atlanta for the Salt Lake Games.

security organizers and plans were ''redefined'' to address ''new kinds of threats, asymmetric threats,'' according to a spokesperson for the Greek Ministry of Public Order (quoted in Vecsey 2004). Response plans were drafted for a total of 211 theoretical terrorist attack and other emergency scenarios, and 10 full-scale operational readiness exercises were staged with name such as ''Trojan Horse,'' ''Gordian Knot,'' and ''Flaming Glaive'' (GAO 2005; Voulgarakis 2005). Such exercises are not unique to post-9/11 Olympics, but the range and depth of these scenarios suggests a much more expansive imagining of the potential forms that terrorism can take than what calculative probability might suggest.

Conceptions of risk have, however, always been infused with ruminations on improbable events, particularly in the realm of international risk assessment. Questions of which risks we should try and mitigate are also inevitably filtered through a cultural lens (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Security officials face pragmatic considerations and resource limitations that structure the amount and forms of security they can provide, and they still deal with far more likely occurrences such as traffic accidents, power outages, protestors, and routine forms of criminality (Decker, Varano, and Greene 2007). Thus actuarialism is not being displaced as if we were moving, *in toto*, from a risk society to a precautionary society, but thinking about security is now twinned with and compounded by an element of precautionary thought that is qualitatively and epistemologically distinct from the probabalism that underpins the logic of risk management. Central to this precautionary thought is the extent to which catastrophic potentialities enters into deliberations about security (Haggerty 2003). Consider, for example, a model developed by the Rand Corporation (Rand 2007) intended to assist in security planning efforts for the London 2012 Olympics. The model is designed to help ''*foresee*, in a structured and systematic way, a range of different potential security environments that could potentially exist in 2012'' (2007:50, emphasis in original), including catastrophic and worst-case scenarios (cf. de Goede 2008:156). The model is composed of three factors: adversary hostile intent, adversary operational capability, and potential domestic/international influences on UK security. Combined, these factors produce 27 possible future security environments (FSEs) ranging from, in the best case, threats using legal, non-violent means in an improved global geopolitical environment to, in the worst, deliberate acts of technologically sophisticated mass violence within a degraded global environment. Within each FSE specific hypothetical scenarios can be devised to measure and develop operational capabilities. Notions of probable or likely futures are explicitly downgraded in this model: the model ''does not give any specific weight to a particular future scenario, rather, it treats *all futures as equally valid*'' (2007:50, emphasis added). This is revealing as it reflects a clear willingness to consider previously ''unthinkable'' possibilities. Including such previously unimaginable scenarios reflects an ascendant precautionary logic in security assessment and planning that exceeds historical frameworks of proportionality.

There is also an increasing official willingness to acknowledge that absolute security is a chimera. Olympic officials routinely indicate in press reports that zero risk is unattainable. These statements are a simultaneous recognition of the ontological impossibility of eliminating risk as much as they are an acceptance that democratic, open, and technologically sophisticated societies afford too many soft targets, interlinked infrastructures, and in-built vulnerabilities that can, theoretically, be exploited by determined groups. Security risks proliferate and exceed the capacity for officials to fully manage or even identify, meaning that it becomes a pressing challenge to maintain the *appearance* of absolute security, or as Ulrich Beck puts it, to ''feign control over the uncontrollable'' (Beck 2002:41, emphasis in original). This challenge bifurcates security into two interrelated realms: the operational ''nuts and bolts'' of security provision and the management of the representational elements of those efforts. These latter efforts help

ensure that security protocols become fodder for an increasing public spectacle of security.

The Spectacle of Security

In January 2006 a reporter interviewed officials involved in operation ''Noble Eagle,'' the codename given to security efforts for the approaching Super Bowl in Detroit. They detailed the presence of such state of the art equipment as gamma ray inspection trucks, bomb-detecting robots and F-16 jets equipped with satellite imagery. Near the end of the article the spokesman for NORAD and US Northern Command makes the curious observation that ''If we are doing our job, nobody sees or hears a wink of this'' (quoted in Hayley 2006). How do we make sense of this statement, one that proclaims the invisibility of security initiatives at the exact moment when they are being meticulously detailed for a national audience? It is a paradox that points to one of the more interesting dynamics in security in the aftermath of 9/11—the tendency for security itself to become a spectacle. Several factors help to account for this development.

Recent years have seen a move toward a self-conscious semiotics of policing. Most notable has been the embrace of zero-tolerance and ''broken windows'' models of public policing (Wilson and Kelling 1982). In both approaches the police explicitly focus on small-scale incivilities and disorderly activities. The logic underlying concentrating on what would otherwise be seen as trivialities unworthy of police attention is that if left unchecked such behaviors will proliferate and escalate, as each disorderly act signifies to a wider public audience that a neighborhood is beyond control. Individuals, in turn, become emboldened to undertake more, and more serious, deviant acts.

Such attention to the wider meanings of disorder represents a shift in police models away from a primary focus on the objective harms of crime to the wider meanings of disorder. The specifics of what messages the police attempt to regulate are themselves structured by the prominent role now played by private interests in policing. This includes the influence of private corporations, private spaces and private police. The fact that business owners are not exclusively concerned with the objective losses associated with crime has helped structure how the semiotics of disorder are regulated. Consider, for example, how at a recent FIFA football match between the Netherlands and Ivory Coast, ''FIFA collaborators found Dutch fans guilty of ambush marketing because of the logo of a Dutch beer company—which was not one of the official FIFA sponsors—on their orange dungarees. Consequently, hundreds of fans had to take off their trousers before entering the 'security ring' around the stadium'' (Klauser 2009:75). In the wide regulatory purview provided by ''broken windows'' models, private interests find an orientation that is appealing because it implicitly justifies the policing of a broad array of people and behaviors. Policing private property consequently becomes concerned with efforts to ban or remove people and activities that do not cohere with the desired image that corporations seek to project about a locale. In practice, this often translates into the exclusion of specific classes of people who themselves become equated with markers of disorder, including vagrants, prostitutes, panhandlers, drug users, the homeless, and certain classes of youth (Hutchinson and O'Connor 2005). Ultimately, this amounts to a form of censorship of human kinds; people are excluded due to the assumption that their very presence signifies disorder to preferred clientele.

As police and security officials recognize the importance of regulating significations of disorder, they have also embraced efforts to publicize signs of order to public audiences (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). High-profile police ''street sweeps'' are undertaken to convey the message that the police ''own'' the street and that they have not abandoned particular neighborhoods, and deliberately

staged ''perp walks'' or highly dramatized news conferences convey a range of messages about crime, order and authority (de Lint, Virta, and Deukmedjian 2007). More mundane, everyday communications include the proliferation of public notices informing/warning citizens about assorted ''watch'' schemes and announcing the presence of CCTV systems. Indeed, the remarkable British embrace of CCTV cameras was partially motivated by a desire to signify to the middle-classes that order was being restored and that urban locations were once again ''open for business'' (Coleman 2004).

Such proactive efforts to convey images of order and security while managing significations of disorder have been embraced and intensified in relation to securing mega-events. Security efforts have a twofold mandate in that they seek to reduce the prospect of untoward eventualities while also fostering a subjective sense of safety among the public. These two tasks occasionally sit uncomfortably with one another due to the well-know fact that public anxieties about assorted risks rarely correspond with the statistical likelihood of such eventualities (Haggerty 2003).

The desire to represent total security has contributed to security itself having become part of the spectacle of mega-events (cf. Bajc 2007). Security practices are increasingly fashioned for public consumption through mass media templates. Specified personnel serve as media security liaisons for mega-events, and the coverage of preparations for the Olympics, G8 meetings, or the World Cup are all now replete with details about the amount of money being spent on security, the number of officers involved, and the radius of restricted airspace around the event. Added to this mix are increasingly familiar images of police snipers, CCTV cameras at strategic locations and officers removing mailboxes and welding shut manhole covers. At least three documentaries are currently being prepared on the security dimensions of the upcoming Vancouver Olympics, including one being produced by the Discovery Channel. Representations such as these are part of a conscious project of public reassurance that aims to fashion a safe image of event sites. Indeed, from the standpoint of fostering public reassurance it matters little whether the security systems work to their proclaimed standards, as much of their value lies in their prospective ability to nurture public trust. In the process, the public draws upon readily available cultural templates to try and decipher the meanings of security. So, a reporter in Athens surrounded by armed guards, surveillance cameras, fully armed Coast Guard vessels, and the ubiquitous Olympic security blimp describes the scene as akin to being on a ''Hollywood set,'' and questions ''What's real and what's for show? What's a barrier? What's an empty milk jug?'' (Roberts 2004).

Countering terrorist messages of radical insecurity through prospective representations of security initiatives also carries its own risks. The spectacle of security must strike a fine balance so that it is not *too* spectacular. While an overt military presence may deter untoward events, mega-events are intense moments in the circulation of capital that produce a strong incentive to keep security as invisible as possible so that the affective dimensions of overt security do not disrupt the circuits of capital and consumption. In Beijing the conspicuous placement of ground-to-air missile launchers near the Bird's Nest stadium formed a striking backdrop for many televised reports from the Games beamed around the globe. Many Olympic sponsors lamented that Beijing's stringent security transformed the events into the ''no fun Games.'' Powerful sponsors are sensitive to the diverse significations of these events. Security officials must avoid depicting a situation that would be perceived by citizens as being ''too great'' of a security spectacle. If it becomes too egregious security stops being reassuring and can paradoxically accentuate the prospect of extreme unmanageable danger. Officials also risk fostering an image of security that resonates with fascism, the twentieth century governmental form which most consciously embraced a spectacular

iconography and symbolism of security. Organizers seek to avoid such scenarios as they can frighten away the very people whom they are seeking to attract or forge unwelcome semiotic connections between corporate sponsors and repressive security tactics. For example, in a newspaper article reproduced across Canada, Vancouver journalists Jeff Lee and Miro Cernetig contemplate the more unpalatable semiotics of Olympic security and ask, ''What will the Lower Mainland look like in 2010 when the world comes calling? Will it be a city under siege? Will it be like the recent IOC conference in Guatemala City, one of Central America's most dangerous cities, where an entire neighborhood was cordoned off and secured by 6,000 machine-gun-toting soldiers and police?'' An RCMP spokesperson was quick to respond in this battle of competing security imaginings by assuring Canadians that ''that's not our way of doing things. Our approach is very Canadian, subtle, but very prepared. The Canadian way is not to have a vision of barbed wire and a Stalag compound'' (quoted in Lee and Cernetig 2007). Indeed, the mantra of the RCMP often cited in the media and by one of our interviewees is that the Olympics should be seen as a ''sporting event with security, not a security event with athletes.'' Ideally, then, security at mega-events operates as an absent presence, apparent to attentive citizens seeking reassurance but inconspicuous enough that the spectacle of security does not itself terrorize the citizenry or undermine the spirit of consumption that sponsors aim to nurture.

The Security Legacies of Mega-Events

The implications of mega-events extend well beyond what occurs on the days of any individual happening. Mega-events foster a legacy of knowledge, networks and habits that have a bearing on the lives of considerably more individuals than those in attendance. This section accentuates some of the more notable of these legacies.

A distinctive attribute of securing contemporary mega-events is the increased use of technology. This is in keeping with the wider embrace of technology in the post-9/11 security environment (Ball and Webster 2003). The 2004 Athens Games set the benchmark for the application of security technology for Olympic Games. The centerpiece of the Athens security apparatus was the surveillance and communications network designed by Science Applications International Corporation to centralize all security-relevant information collected through various human and technological security channels and allow for a unified and integrated emergency response. It was composed of approximately 67 subsystems including 130 fixed and five mobile command centers, a secure digital trunk radio network with 23,000 terminals, a geographic information system, decision support applications, and the Standard Olympic Security Data Network. Biometric identification cards, 1,800 CCTV cameras, and an overhead surveillance blimp equipped with infrared surveillance and high-tech communications equipment surveyed and controlled access to all Olympic venues (Samatas 2004, 2007).

This system is a microcosm of wider tendencies in the field of security governance, most notably the desire to seamlessly integrate technological, informational and human capabilities in order to hopefully anticipate, detect, and respond to security issues. We should, however, avoid the temptation to fixate on novel technologies to the exclusion of other more familiar and occasionally prosaic security practices and devices. Olympic security also relies on familiar practices such as nested security rings, the camouflage of CI assets, checkpoints and containment zones, barricades, and barbed wire. While there are questions about how well such integration works in practice (Samatas 2007), one of the more prominent security legacies of mega-events is the ongoing alignment of diverse human and technological elements. The number and heterogeneity of factors to

be coordinated in pursuing security at such events is simply more massive and complicated than in almost any other non-military context. They also provide the impetus for experiments with novel combinations of security components, forging and intensifying nodal connections to a degree that would otherwise be unlikely or unfeasible.

Security initiatives implemented for an event, whether they be CCTV systems, public-private policing partnerships, legal changes, screening technologies, or informational databases, all have ways of being re-rationalized for other uses once their original application context has disappeared. This is not necessarily a development unique to post-9/11 Olympics, but what is novel about the post-9/11 period is that long-term security legacies are not understood to be accidental, unintended, nor partial outcomes of today's events; they are explicit objectives, another ostensible benefit to be leveraged from an opportune moment. The C4I system in Athens, for example, was one element in a broader upgrade and retrofit of the entire Greek policing and military apparatus including refurbished police stations and equipment and advanced training for Special Forces (Samatas 2004; GAO 2005). Though Greece's security efforts during the 17-day period of the Games reflect the dominant role the United States played in setting Greece's domestic agenda (Tsoukala 2006), the continuing use of the C4I system reflects Greece's explicit objectives to use the Olympics as an opportunity to upgrade and modernize different aspects of the country. Speaking in relation to their $1.5 billion USD Olympic security budget, George Floridis, Greek Minister of Public Order stated:

> this great expenditure, however, is not concerned only with the duration of the Olympics. It is an investment for the future. The special training, technical know-how, and ultramodern equipment will turn the Hellenic Police into one of the best and most professional in the world, for the benefit of the Greek people. (Floridis 2004: 4)

Indeed, Greece saw the Olympics as an ideal opportunity to transform Greece into a counter-terrorism superpower whose knowledge and technologies could be marketed internationally (Murphy 2004).

Similar legacies promise to be key outcomes of other post-9/11 Olympics. A high-ranking security official for two Olympic organizing committees indicated to us in a personal email communication that ''all Games represent an opportunity for governments, municipalities and of course law enforcement agencies to create legacies, implement their structures and modernize their equipment.'' He went on to note that in Turin,

> the physical security system (PSS) not only served as a key element for deterring, detecting and denying any possible breach of security within the Olympic Theatre, but also represented an incredibly valuable legacy for the future. Today, the municipalities of Turin and of the mountain villages that hosted the Games can showcase modern sporting sites and ice arenas equipped with the state-of-the-art CCTV camera systems, [while] magnetometers and X-rays [sic] machines were reallocated in other public buildings across the country.

The legacies of 2004 and 2006 are dwarfed in comparison to the security and surveillance measures that were implemented for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Security preparations for the 2008 Games were subsumed under the broader umbrella of the *Grand Beijing Safeguard Sphere*, a massive effort initiated in 2001 to upgrade Beijing's security infrastructure at a reported cost of $6.5 billion USD (SIA 2007). Given this expenditure it is not surprising that American corporations are eager to enter the Chinese security market; General Electric,

Honeywell, IBM, and United Technologies are all supplying China with the high-tech equipment and expertise needed to realize what cultural critic Naomi Klein has dubbed ''Police State 2.0'' (Bradsher 2007; Klein 2008).

The 2012 Games are also being leveraged as an opportunity to retrofit, upgrade, and expand London's existing security infrastructure. London Metropolitan Chief Inspector Andrew Amery says ''we want the security legacy to be us leaving a safe and secure environment for the communities of East London after the games, on issues such as Safer Neighborhoods, lighting and crime prevention. We want a Games and a legacy that will reduce crime and the fear of crime'' (quoted in Potter 2006). Such a legacy may be welcome in East London, but a UK government memo outlines other less publicized initiatives including the wider use of DNA databases to identify individuals through their relatives, integrating London's patchwork of CCTV cameras (and thereby putting up to 500,000 at the London Metropolitan Police's disposal) and building a new command center for the London Met, all of which are envisioned for completion before 2012 (Hennessy and Leapman 2007; BBC 2008).

As these examples suggest, mega-events are consciously leveraged as developmental opportunities for long-term security legacies, providing the justification and finances for security and surveillance surges designed to leave an infrastructure of urban surveillance. They are also moments where public opposition to such projects is often at its weakest, something that is capitalized on by officials looking to ratchet-up existing surveillance measures. In London, for example, the same government document mentioned above identifies a need to overcome public opposition to the proposed measures and concludes ''increasing [public] support could be possible through the piloting of certain approaches in high-profile ways such as the London Olympics'' (Hennessy and Leapman 2007, insertion in original).

Mega-events also foster the production and circulation of sophisticated and specialized security knowledges. While the operational security needs for different events can vary substantially, they share the common fact that they often outstrip locally available expertise and resources. As these events continue to ''pop-up'' around the world, there arises a comparable need for mobile ''pop-up'' security practices (Warren 2004).

Canada and the United States have tried to address this problem by developing special event designations and using standardized security templates. In the American context the relevant policy is the NSSE designation. Created by President Clinton's 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 62, an event deemed to be of national significance will automatically become the responsibility of the USSS. Of the 28 NSSE designations between 1998 and 2007, seven were sporting events (six Super Bowls and the 2002 Olympics), all of which have come after 9/11 (Reese 2008). Canada mimics such efforts with its Major Event designation. Like the NSSE classification, a major event in Canada is defined as one of national or international significance where the overall responsibility for security rests with the federal government. Also like the NSSE, the major event designation automatically centralizes all security responsibilities, a role assumed in Canada by the RCMP.

Both the RCMP and the USSS have internal Major Event Divisions responsible for crafting major event security policy. They also use standardized security templates to maintain continuity in security planning between events and to act as institutional memory banks for lessons learned from previous events. In the Canadian case the relevant policy is the Major Events Template, which is modeled on the Incident Command System, a crisis management tool combined with a defined set of positions, roles, and responsibilities. In an interview, one of the RCMP operational planners responsible for drafting aspects of the template describes it as

> a policy piece or a structure, a tool that someone can use who's planning an event as to how they go about it. The concepts behind it are the first steps, then how to build a team and that sort of thing. And then it gets into specifics of individuals in that planning structure. As far as a tool, it standardizes our systems so that someone who is just starting to plan can look at this and get a sense of where to start and who to talk to.

Our interviews with RCMP officials and related documentation indicate that the further development of this template will be one key outcome of the 2010 Winter Games. The Director of the Major Events Division described how the template is ''basically the blueprint that we will follow when we coordinate major events across Canada'' and that the department is ''leveraging the planning process [for the 2010 Winter Games] in order to support the development of the template and our planning processes internally.'' Though the funding structure and size of the Games means that what works in 2010 ''will not apply uniformly in the coordination of major events across Canada in the future,'' the Games are seen as a ''platform to learn that much more because of the amount of security that will go into it,'' according to the Director.

The template will develop by incorporating lessons learned and best practices gleaned from other events and real-world experience. It also relies on the tacit, experiential knowledge needed to make the template work. As MacKenzie (1996) has noted, complex technological systems consist of both formal artifacts and the practical knowledges and understanding of such artifacts. It can be exceedingly difficult to make such systems operate by relying exclusively on blueprints or manuals. One also requires the practical knowledge gained in the real world to make systems function. While formal knowledge can be stored indefinitely, tacit knowledge can be lost through decaying skills or a failure to pass along such abilities to a new generation of practitioners. Major event security, as a form of complex system, also relies on specialized training and preparations mechanisms aimed at generating stocks of experiential security knowledge and expertise. A 2005 RCMP planning document (RCMP 2005), for example, details numerous training seminars and professional conferences in other countries which personnel from the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit ''have attended, reviewed, and shared best practices,'' including numerous IOC-sponsored knowledge transfer services, government-sponsored post-Games debriefing events, direct observation of other political summits and sporting events, and numerous FBI and USSS training conferences.

These processes culminate in a formalized body of knowledge and the tacit skills needed to make them work that can, in principle, be transposed from event to event. For Canada, one of the legacies to stem from the 2010 Games will be the further development of a mobile security diagram informed by a wide range of domestic and international experience and honed through an exceptional public event involving numerous security agencies working in an integrated fashion in what the RCMP and Canadian Forces have repeatedly characterized as a ''no-fail'' operation. Insofar as intra-national organizations and networks are increasingly forged surrounding these events the circulation of such expertise will continue to move beyond individual nations to become part of a multi-scalar and globalizing network of security knowledge.

There is also a flurry of indirect knowledge and technology transfers surrounding the Olympics or other mega-events that have almost nothing to do with staging comparable events. These secondary processes help circulate technologies and expertise honed for the extraordinary conditions of mega-events into wider society. A prominent example of this occurred at the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa Bay where, for the first time, security officials deployed a large-scale assemblage of cameras, biometric software and terrorist databases to surreptitiously scan and

record the facial image of every spectator at that event. Afterwards the cameras were relocated to a nearby Tampa Bay neighborhood, where the technology monitored public streets (Gips 2001). This example underscores how major events are seen as a real-world mock-up of security initiatives that might be employed in more prosaic situations.

More broadly, 9/11 raised the question of how to secure open, complex, and infrastructurally vulnerable societies from asymmetrical attacks. Officials have looked to the models and principles of Olympic security as one way to address this problem. A post-Salt Lake Olympics security conference, for example, sought to apply lessons from the ''Olympic Security Model'' to US homeland security (Oquirrh Institute 2002). Addressing the conference, IOC security consultant Peter Ryan noted why Olympic security preparations are relevant to national security and helped redefine the territorial dimensions of national security:

> a security plan on the Olympic scale is directly related to the national defense of any host country.... But the traditional national defense has been principally to defend against conventional military attack, not necessarily against internal or external terrorist attack. The security operations for the Olympics Games are in fact, exactly designed to do just that, and much more. It simply tests every plan we have for every contingency. The lessons from this for any nation must be preserved and absorbed and developed further. National security now begins on the streets of our cities, the ports and airports, and vulnerable borders which all nations have. (Ryan 2002:24–25)

Similarly, *Jane's Intelligence Review* (Hinds and Vlachou 2007) has encouraged officials in the United Kingdom to establish mechanisms to ensure that lessons learned from the Olympics can be applied to national security efforts.

Private firms are helping drive this process. The massive budgets and cultural capital associated with Olympic involvement makes them the security industry equivalent of what Paris or Milan is to the fashion industry. The successful pilot testing of security practices and technologies—or, more accurately, the lack of stunning failures—helps to ensure that new knowledge, practices and devices emerge as ''proven'' solutions to be marketed as applications suitable for other contexts. The *Olympic Update* supplement to the Security Industry Association's *China Security Market Report* (SIA 2007) identifies the 2008 Olympics as bringing ''huge commercial opportunities'' (2007:26) and an unprecedented opening that can help to build brand awareness in the world's fastest-growing security market. The SIA recommended that contractors for the 2008 Beijing Games consider the event as a platform to launch into the Chinese security market including the freshly stimulated urban public security market (2007:54). Similarly, the London 2012 Olympics are hailed by the British Security Industry Association as a ''sellers market'' and a ''fantastic showcase'' for the British security industry to ''demonstrate that it actually is an important resource in public reassurance and safety'' (Inside the Games 2008).

The marketable experience that comes with being involved in Olympic security also helps disperse security knowledge and practice. Olympic security experience can translate into lucrative consultation and risk management contracts with government and private firms. Peter Ryan, the IOC security advisor quoted above, is a highly sought speaker, particularly on the topic of CI protection and energy security, based on his experience in Olympic security planning going back to the 2000 Sydney Games. The cultural capital and business connections that such key individuals produce helps move Olympic security ideas and practices beyond the Games. As these are marketed and/or mimicked, even tangentially,[5] as the

[5] A 2008 American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) Conference and Trade show held just weeks after the Beijing Olympics was marketed as ''the Olympics of security.''

security ''gold standard'' through security industry conferences and trade shows, Olympic security ideas and practices are poised to trickle out to more routine events. This dispersion is aided by the formulation of event security handbooks and manuals such as those put out by, in the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the Department of Justice (FEMA 2005; Connors 2007), or training programs such as the newly created *National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security* at the University of Southern Mississippi that boasts as its director James McGee, a retired FBI agent deeply involved in two Olympics and numerous Super Bowls.

One consequence of these knowledge transfer dynamics is the further erasure of the ostensible line between military and civilian applications of high technology (Nunn 2003). As one of the effects of 9/11 was the increased securitization of urban centers (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006), it follows that the increased militarization of event security also means the militarization of cities. These security legacies also have a series of global implications for the future of urban spaces more generally due to the processes that inform how cities are chosen to sponsor mega-events. The competitors for such events are typically premier cites including London, Vancouver, Beijing, and New York. Such locations are, or aspire to be, models of global cities. Given that part of the legacy of mega-events appears to be a step change in the security infrastructure of each host city, the templates for what is entailed in being a global city consequently also undergo a change, increasingly appealing to urban exemplars that have been re-imagined in light of new security initiatives.

Finally, the transformations in security dynamics surrounding mega-events offer a palpable pedagogy of security. The undeniable physical presence of security devices and routines, combined with their spectacular media representations, familiarize individuals with the routines of high security. In addition to reducing public anxieties about terrorist attacks, the spectacle of security also attunes individuals to new security realities and helps to normalize the indignities of personal revelation associated with demands for documents and requirements to reveal oneself and one's body through assorted screening practices. The proliferating security routines characteristic of mega-events fosters a security-infused pedagogy of acceptable comportment, dress and documentation, as small lessons in security are inflated and played out before a global audience. Although largely imperceptible, it is this pedagogy in the personal routines of an advanced security assemblage that might be one of the most lasting legacies of mega-events due to how this, in turn, helps fashion a doxa of security. For Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), doxa refers to a society's self-evident truths. The undeniable presence of intensive security measures at mega-events reinforces the taken-for-granted sense that such measures are required, that they do not unduly infringe upon personal liberties, that certain dangers are pervasive—and more pressing than other risks—and that the existing constellation of security interests is inevitable. The increasingly normalized spectacle of security fosters a sense in which such assumptions become so self-evident that they are beyond critique.

Conclusion

It should be evident that Foucault's strict demarcation between spectacle and surveillance does not hold in the context of mega-events. Instead, our analysis suggests that Debord's emphases on spectacle and Foucault's work on surveillance accentuate processes that can operate in concert (Crary 1999:76). Surveillance is now a prominent attribute of security for mega-events. The spectacularity of these events helps justify the most advanced security technologies and practices as their media-profile positions them as prominent potential terrorist targets. Developments in the security of mega-events do nonetheless support

Foucault's more general argument about the dispersal of discipline. Contemporary mega-events represent one of the more extreme manifestations of practices of surveillance, documentation, categorization, and the ordering of bodies in space which Foucault argued are characteristic of the movement of disciplinary power into the wider social fabric.

Much of the analytical focus on mega-events has concentrated on their local implications, particularly on how they re-fashion urban environments. Our orientation is to recognize and think critically about such developments, but to also accentuate how mega-events contribute to a wider series of global processes. Driven by a security logic that is increasingly oriented to negating the prospects of a vastly expanded range of dangers, security planning for mega-events has undergone a dramatic quantitative expansion. The social significance of such efforts is not confined to their ability to reduce threats, but also involves an effort to ease public anxiety. Security, like justice, must not only be done, it must be *seen* to be done (de Lint et al. 2007). At the same time spectacular representations of security continually risk breaching desired limits, fostering a semiotics of in-security that undermines the project of public reassurance by inadvertently accentuating the ultimately uncontrollability of contemporary threats.

Urban and postmodern theorists have garnered many important insights about power, consumption and space from studying fantastic locations such as Disney World and Las Vegas. Mega-events also offer important lessons about local and global processes. Mega-events are quintessential non-locations in that they are essentially transitory. They are an opportunity for the momentary coming-together of leading edge global developments in technology, advertising and, as we have emphasized, security and surveillance. Notwithstanding their transience, mega-events have a wider international legacy. The funds now dedicated to event security have drawn the private sector ever more into the world of security provision, fashioning new forms of knowledge, technology and tacit skills. The events themselves publicize a model of the global city as one which is replete with advanced security measures. The undeniable physical presence of all of these security measures helps forge a doxic common sense that intrusive security and surveillance measures represent an inevitable feature and future of urban life, foreclosing debate on the necessity, desirability and inherent dangers in our new spectacle of security.

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